Saturday, 30 January 2010

1869 The former Prime Minister at Iraq Inquiry

I went to prison in 1960 to express my opposition to the possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction, refusing to agree not to continue undertaking non violent civil disobedience for a period of two years. I was able to leave prison at any time if I agreed to the undertaking. While supporting non violent civil disobedience and other action to indicate a personal position, encouraging others to do likewise in the hope of changing the position of the UK government and governments in general. Even before before going into further and higher education and training, I accepted the that the role of any government was to protect its people from violence and crimes from within the state as well as from without. It could be argued that this is only legitimate role for a government and that all its others are options which in a democracy should depend on the will of the people.

This was one major reason why I supported the decision of the USA and UK governments to invade Iraq in 2003 to remove weapons of mass destruction from the control of its leaders who had used chemical and biological weapons against their own countrymen and in the war against Iran and where an estimated I million are thought to have prematurely died because of the power and political ambitions of the controlling family. When no such weapons were found in a situation where it appeared the majority opinion in the UK was against our involvement it was evident that there would be political repercussions for the Prime Minister in particular and Labour administration in general, particularly because of his style of political leadership and management, from having been in power for six years, having won a second term with a large majority, and successfully managing the economy appearing to have brought to an end the years of boom and bust.

Seven years later all the emotions and beliefs about the intervention and its aftermath are being revisited through the Chilcot Inquiry.

Until the appearance of Tony Blair before the Iraq Inquiry on Friday January 29th 2010 I was impressed with the inquiry panel which appeared to me to be asking all the right questions raised by critics as well as treating witnesses with respect and showing a good understanding of their different roles.

However yesterday the panel failed to show appropriate respect to a former Prime Minister, and one who history may well come to regard as a major figure in British political history. The panel appears to me to have become biased and prejudiced and pandering to the media who motives appear to be Party political with a General Election looming.

Whereas all previous witnesses were given some opportunity to put into context their positions Mr Blair was rudely interrupted whenever he made the attempt to explain his approach in context, although the chairman did intervene at one point.

I hope the Inquiry will give Mr Blair the opportunity to supplement his evidence with additional information if he wishes. I believe the context in terms of the role taken by the UK in the intervention other situations prior to Iraq is highly relevant as well as 2010 question if the action had not been taken. The panel member who commented that an alternative to the Blair 2010 proposition was that the former leadership could still be contained not only demonstrated his bias but detachment form the reality of what that would have meant for the people of Iraq, for the stability in the middle east in general.

I make these comments having been a member of an important child care inquiry in 1980 conducted originally on an adversarial legal basis with 50 legal officers, from QC’s to solicitor's clerks, attending on the first day but which was quickly switched to a hybrid where the panel conducted the inquiry on an inquisitorial basis but legal representatives were also able to question and introduce the evidence of their clients. The two forms of Inquiry are different and the panel appear to have forgotten they are undertaking the latter and not the former

I appreciate the Iraq inquiry has given witnesses the opportunity to submit detailed memoranda and documentation in advance of their appearance

As someone who became one of the longest serving Directors of Social Services in the UK 1974-1992 and experienced different forms of political and management styles to government I also detect that the panel appear through their questioning to have become prejudiced against the leadership style of the former Prime Minister in favour of the traditional civil service and local government style of formal committees and sub committee, agendas and papers, and minute circulation. My experience was that this produced a stable but ineffective system in terms of bringing about change and getting things done as intended.

In fact for the first years in my local authority there was such an obsession with the formality and decision taking process that I had to point out that no one was bothering to find out if what had been agreed was being implemented or if the action taken was effective and meeting the intentions of the decision takers. I also became skilled in ensuring that the minutes of meetings reflected my interpretation of decisions rather than that of the minute takers.

The other lesson which I quickly learnt was that if I was to be held personally accountable for everything which happened in an organisation with 1000s of employees and ten of millions annual expenditure of public money, then it was wise to personally take all the key decisions, having listened to the often conflicting advice and information and then to check that the decision was implanted in the way I had made clear. Records and paper were only a means for defending and verification but never for getting things done. However it important to also remember who Guards the Guardians?

I also accept that many people will have been angered by what Mr Blair had to say, especially those whose opposition to British participation in the war remains ideological or emotional, or both. Most serious political analysts and commentators will not have been surprised by his general approach and individual responses. As has been observed by some he appeared nervous and anxious when he commenced but quickly relaxed and settled into restating what he has said to Parliament and other inquiries. What was new and what impressed me most was his argument about what would have happened had the USA and the UK not intervened when they did. This is based on the finding of those who investigated why the regime had in fact pretended they continued to possess weapons of mass destruction when they had they not. This was only to gain international acceptability and an ending of sanctions but there was the proven intention to regain biological and chemical as well as developing nuclear power for military purposes and the missiles to deliver them. The former Prime Minister made the point that given the subsequent rise in the price of oil from 10 to 100 dollars a barrel he would also have had the financial means to develop the weaponry on a substantial scale. The threat would have become even greater. There was comment from the inquiry that equally the possibility was that he would have been contained as before the intervention. This was an aside to which I would have challenged are you saying it would therefore had been alright for him to oppress his people, torturing killing opponents depriving children and babies of medication and adequate health care, excluding 80% of the population from any involvement in government or government positions on racial grounds.

The charges against Blair is that he made a commitment to the President of the United States to support getting rid of the Iraq leadership and then found the means to do so, that there was an agreement to go to war at a secret meeting at which he and President spoke together without officials, that the dossier on weapons of mass destruction presented to Parliament in order to persuade the Commons to vote in favour of action was doctored for political reasons and pressure was successfully exerted on the Attorney General, the chief Legal adviser, to declare that that intervention was legal in terms of International Law.

There was also criticism levelled that the military had been given insufficient time to prepare for combat and were ill equipped under resourced. The USA and Britain also inadequately prepared for the aftermath and miscalculated the consequences in terms of the intervention of Iran and Terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. The criticism is that the world has become a more dangerous places as a direct consequence of the intervention and that the people in Iraq are worse of rather than better and therefore by implication that the 200 or so British service men and women who died and all those who were substantially injured did so in vain.

There was a clear denial of the charges that he was determined to intervene in major way alongside the USA regardless of the existence of EMD, in order to change the regime, that he had ensured that the worst case scenario was presented to Parliament in order to obtain Parliamentary approval or on pressurising the Attorney General. He then made the point that he had made judgements and taken decisions within a context of his general approach and strategy. He accepted there were differences and strong differences about the judgements and the decisions but the charges about conspiracies and fixing outcomes were false. However I accept their is fine line between what all governments do to get results in a democracy and doing so outside the rules applicable at the time. The attorney general covered himself by saying that although a legal case could be made for the action in terms of International Law he could not say what the outcome would be if his view was put to the test in an international court. The emphasis was also on that whatever pressure had been exerted on the Attorney General to come off the fence any decision was always his own and therefore its responsibility.

There most successful aspect of the evidence was for me the explanation that that in order to achieve the desired outcome of the UN resolutions of which the last one at the time was the strongest to date of several, that regime change was the solution which would work. The objective was not regime but the means for achieving the objective. I thought Mr Blair could have been made this point better.

He also reacted strongly to the suggestion that the forces had been given insufficient time to prepare and were under equipped and resourced. He had told the Military of that they encountered problems because of red tape they should come directly to him and they had not done so. There was an admission that he had been economical with the truth in response to a Parliamentary question about the preparedness of the military for a combat intervention. At the time there had been no decision to intervene but acting on the advice of the military there has been some preparations necessary. He had subsequently agreed to making the position public acting on the advice of the Foreign Secretary.

He was also willing to admit that everyone had got wrong what would happen if you immediately removed the civil service, police and military structures, failing to have understood the extent to which power and decision taking had been held by a few and fear and corruption had permeated through every aspect of civil and social life. The other aspect was the failure to plan for the way Iran then intervened in an attempt to make the new regime fail. It had been assumed that they would appreciate the removal of the ruling family which had led to war and the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives on both sides. I would have pursued this aspect further because it beggars belief that those employed to make risk and worst scenario assessments did not anticipate that while Iran would be overjoyed at the demise of the controlling family and the removal of nuclear capability, biological and chemical weaponry they would be equally opposed to the development of democracy in Iraq, of a potentially secular state. Of the presence of foreign troops and administrators on their doorstep and power being given to Muslims unsympathetic to their brand of the religion, I accepted what Mr Blain said about successfully managing the humanitarian consequences, but I have some sympathy for the panel who stated rather than posed the question that the preparations for the aftermath had been cavalier. The root problem was in fact the failure to immediately establish order and security.

I woke up this morning to find over six inches of snow. I had not checked the weather forecast so I do not know if it was predicted but with the temperatures still at freezing the omens are not good.

No comments:

Post a Comment